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MARKETS AND MORALS: THE LIMITS OF
DOUX COMMERCE
MARK L. MOVSESIAN*
ABSTRACT
In this Essay on Professor Oman’s beautifully written and
meticulously researched book, The Dignity of Commerce, I do three
things. First, I describe what I take to be the central message of the
book, namely, that markets promote liberal values of tolerance,
pluralism, and cooperation among rival, even hostile groups. Second, I show how Oman’s argument draws from a line of political
and economic thought that dates to the Enlightenment, the so-called
doux commerce thesis of thinkers like Montesquieu and Adam Smith.
Finally, I discuss what I consider the most penetrating criticism of
that thesis, Edmund Burke’s critique from tradition, which suggests
we should be careful attributing too much to markets’ ability to
promote liberal pluralism. According to Burke, it is the Western
tradition, not commerce, which creates the tolerant, pluralist marketplace of the doux commerce thesis. That Burke was correct is
suggested by several historical examples and by contemporary
events in the United States and across the globe. That is not to say
that Oman is entirely wrong about the potential political benefits
of the market, only that we should be careful not to overstate them.
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Essay appears at the Library of Law and Liberty. Mark L. Movsesian, Is It Really
Commercial Activity That Civilizes?, LIBR. OF L. & LIBERTY (June 26, 2017),
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INTRODUCTION
I thank the William & Mary Center for the Study of Law
and Markets for inviting me to participate in this symposium on
Professor Oman’s new book, The Dignity of Commerce.1 Oman has
written a wonderful book in the great tradition of American contracts jurisprudence. He combines immense learning and sophistication with a lightness of touch that makes the book a pleasure
to read. I do not know other contracts scholarship that manages
to address, in turn, The Merchant of Venice,2 colonial India,3 the
Histories of Herodotus,4 the Cairo Geniza,5 the Pukhtun tribes of
Pakistan,6 and Kaldor-Hicks “efficiency!”7 This meticulously researched, thoughtful, and beautifully written book will make an
enduring contribution to American contracts learning.
I agree with Oman about many things. I agree, for example,
that markets are beneficial, and that contracts and contract law are
valuable aspects of a well-functioning society. I agree, too, that trade
promotes wealth, social development, and even, occasionally, a
benign indifference to certain divisive issues. Nonetheless, I find
myself disagreeing with Oman’s central claim about the political
benefits of markets. It is a friendly disagreement; in the end, it may
amount to little more than a difference in emphasis. But it seems
to me an important one. I am much more skeptical than Oman that
commerce can have the beneficial political effects he identifies.
In this Essay, I will do three things. First, I will describe what
I take to be the central argument of The Dignity of Commerce,
namely, that markets have moral worth because they promote the
liberal values of tolerance, cooperation, and pluralism.8 Second, I will
show that Oman’s argument draws on a line of thought that dates
back to the Enlightenment, the so-called doux commerce thesis of
thinkers like Montesquieu and Smith.9 Finally, I will address what I
NATHAN B. OMAN, THE DIGNITY OF COMMERCE: MARKETS AND THE MORAL
FOUNDATIONS OF CONTRACT LAW (2016).
2 See generally id. at 1–8, 183.
3 Id. at 29.
4 Id. at 34–35.
5 Id. at 30.
6 Id. at 44–45.
7 Id. at 68–69.
8 See infra text accompanying notes 18–23.
9 See infra text accompanying notes 54–79.
1
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consider the most penetrating critique of that thesis—and, therefore, Oman’s argument—namely Edmund Burke’s critique from tradition, and explain why it seems to me correct. We should be careful
attributing too much to markets’ capacity to promote liberal pluralism.10 Indeed, in my opinion, current events at home and abroad
demonstrate the limits of the doux commerce thesis, and do so
rather decisively.11
I. THE DIGNITY OF COMMERCE
The Dignity of Commerce is an ambitious book. Oman covers
most major topics in contemporary contracts scholarship, including efficiency and distributive fairness;12 adhesion contracts and
unconscionability;13 contract remedies;14 contracts against public
policy;15 and, of course, consideration.16 At heart, though, the book
attempts to answer the fundamental question of contract law, the
one that precedes all the others: why should the law enforce contracts in the first place?17 Why, with respect to some promises—for
the law could not enforce all promises; that would be unworkable—
should courts require the promisor either to perform or pay damages? What makes the enforcement of contracts legitimate and not
the arbitrary exercise of state power over one citizen at the insistence of another?
Oman maintains that the law should enforce contracts because contracts undergird commerce—and commerce promotes good
politics.18 More specifically, commerce promotes the liberal virtues of tolerance and cooperation necessary for pluralist politics.19
Oman’s argument is thus a moral one.20 Contracts are morally
good because they facilitate markets, and markets are morally
good because they promote values essential for liberalism and
See infra text accompanying notes 105–14.
See infra text accompanying notes 167–92.
12 See generally OMAN, supra note 1, at 67–85.
13 See generally id. at 133–59.
14 See generally id. at 112–32.
15 See generally id. at 160–81.
16 See generally id. at 89–111.
17 See id. at 16.
18 See id.
19 See id. at 19, 43–49.
20 Id. at 15 (“Markets are good because as a social practice they produce certain
outcomes that we should regard as morally desirable.”).
10
11
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pluralism.21 (That liberalism and pluralism are themselves morally good is taken as a given). Of course, classical liberalism and
pluralism are related.22 In fact, they mutually reinforce one another: classical liberalism promotes pluralism, and pluralism, in
turn, promotes classical liberalism.23 But Oman tends to analyze
the two concepts separately.
Start with classical liberalism. Markets, he maintains, “generate a set of moral habits—virtues—that support a liberal political order.”24 Markets encourage us to see things from other people’s
points of view.25 You cannot sell customers something if you do not
understand what they want or need (or think they want or need).26
This ability to consider alternative perspectives and offer persuasive
appeals for our own position is essential to the reasoned deliberation liberalism requires.27 Markets also “weaken loyalty to tribe
and family,” thus promoting our “ability to relate to strangers according to impersonal criteria,” another quality essential for classical liberalism.28 And, finally, markets promote equality rather
than inherited status, a goal of liberalism from the start.29
Relatedly, markets allow us to adapt to the pluralism that pervades modern life—the unavoidable, continuing contact with people
who have competing, often opposing, lifestyles and commitments.30
Markets, Oman argues, “provid[e] a mechanism by which those with
sharply differing religious, moral, and political beliefs can peacefully
Id. at 15–16.
See generally id. at 40 (discussing how well-functioning markets support
liberalism which, in turn, provides a framework for pluralism).
23 Id.
24 Id. at 19.
25 Id. at 44.
26 Oman has made this argument more recently elsewhere as well. See Nathan
B. Oman, Doux Commerce, Religion, and the Limits of Antidiscrimination Law,
92 IND. L.J. 693, 710–11 (2017) [hereinafter Oman, Doux Commerce].
27 OMAN, supra note 1, at 46 (“It is only by acquiring the ability to see the
world through the eyes of another that effective political cooperation is possible.
This is precisely the skill demanded of a successful trader.”).
28 Id. at 43.
29 Id. at 43–44 (“[M]arkets break down aristocratic habits, encouraging people to relate peaceably as equals.”). On liberalism’s goals with respect to equality
and inherited status, see PATRICK J. DENEEN, CONSERVING AMERICA?: ESSAYS
ON PRESENT DISCONTENTS 160 (2017).
30 See OMAN, supra note 1, at 40 (discussing “the pervasive pluralism of contemporary society”); id. at 51 (noting that “moral pluralism” is “[o]ne of the hallmarks of
modern society”).
21
22
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cooperate.”31 Markets promote trust between strangers, including
strangers from rival and hostile communities.32 Repeated exchanges
in the marketplace, over time, can reassure us that others also
value fidelity and fair dealing, whatever their racial, religious, or
sexual identities.33 The market thus trains people to put deep, intractable differences aside—to look the other way—in the interests
of closing the deal.34 In the long run, looking the other way allows
people to build relationships of trust they otherwise would not
have had.35 Even if such relationships do not form, learning to
look the other way allows us all to avoid conflicts and get on with
our lives with a minimum of disturbance.36
Finally, Oman maintains, markets are morally good because they produce wealth.37 “[M]oney answereth all things,” the
Bible says.38 Money certainly helps alleviate many social problems, including, as Oman powerfully argues, deficiencies in public
health.39 “Wealth ... tends to improve conditions for marginalized
members of society,” like women, whose “access to formal legal
rights closely correlates with a society’s wealth.”40 In global terms,
commerce has contributed greatly to the growth in countries’
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) since World War II.41 The effects
of international trade in promoting wealth, and thus social welfare,
are especially pronounced in the parts of the developing world
that have opened themselves up to global markets.42
31 Id. at 19. See also Nathan Oman, Indiana and Doux Commerce, LAW &
RELIG. F. (April 3, 2015), https://lawandreligionforum.org/2015/04/03/Indi
ana-and-doux-commerce/ [https://perma.cc/5LLT-6ZB7].
32 OMAN, supra note 1, at 30. See also id. at 173 (“[T]he interaction with [a
restaurant waiter] may be morally valuable, bringing me into positive and productive contact with a stranger outside of my ordinary tribal circle.”).
33 Id. at 58.
34 See id. at 56 (noting that markets encourage participants “to put aside
political, moral, or religious concerns when engaged in market transactions”).
See also id. at 58.
35 Id. at 58.
36 Id. at 56.
37 See generally id. at 58–66.
38 Ecclesiastes 10:19 (King James).
39 OMAN, supra note 1, at 64.
40 Id.
41 See John O. McGinnis & Mark L. Movsesian, The World Trade Constitution,
114 HARV. L. REV. 511, 521–22 (2000).
42 Id.
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In these moral benefits of markets, Oman finds answers for
many enduring puzzles in contract law. For example, in the great
consideration debate—that attractive nuisance for contracts
scholars—Oman’s appreciation for markets causes him to favor
the bargain requirement.43 If the point of contract law is to facilitate market transactions, and, indirectly, good politics, then bargain
should naturally mark out the domain of enforceable promises.44
In fact, he maintains, market promises should be enforceable even
in the absence of a classical quid pro quo.45 And the moral benefits
of markets lead him to be somewhat skeptical of attempts to regulate transactions through doctrines like unconscionability and
voidness for public policy.46 It is far better, he says, for the state
to regulate social ills like inequality directly, than to forbid entire
categories of commercial transactions.47
Oman recognizes that not all markets have good moral consequences.48 “Pernicious” markets, he writes, do not deserve legal
protection.49 The Atlantic slave trade was a market, but it was a
moral horror.50 Likewise, the state may need to intervene where
a market systematically excludes whole classes of people, as in
the Jim Crow South.51 And Oman recognizes that the market may
colonize non-commercial areas of life where it does not belong—
such as marriage and family—ruining many human relationships
by reducing them to arm’s length bargains.52 The law should take
care to avoid this danger, Oman says, and resist attempts to apply
the market metaphor indiscriminately to all human interactions.53
II. THE DOUX COMMERCE THESIS
As Oman acknowledges, his argument for the beneficial political effect of markets goes back a long way in Western political
See OMAN, supra note 1, at 90.
Id.
45 Id.
46 Id. at 161.
47 See id. at 180–81.
48 Id. at 160.
49 Id. at 160, 167.
50 Id. at 163, 168.
51 See id. at 25. See also Oman, Doux Commerce, supra note 26, at 716–17.
52 See OMAN, supra note 1, at 173–75.
53 Id. at 173–74.
43
44
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thought, to the doux commerce thesis of the Enlightenment.54 The
thesis is most closely associated with French philosophes like
Montesquieu and Voltaire, but Scottish Enlightenment figures like
Smith and Hume also endorsed it.55 The thesis—the phrase usually translates into English as “gentle” commerce, though “gentle”
does not fully capture the meaning—holds that commerce tends
to civilize people; to make us more reasonable and prudent; less
given to political and, especially, religious enthusiasm; more reliable, honest, thrifty, and industrious.56
Nowadays, we think of market benefits mostly in terms of
the wealth creation that comes through the division of labor and
comparative advantage.57 But the doux commerce theorists focused
on the market’s political benefits—principally three, all interrelated.58 First, commerce facilitates stable government by promoting
the virtues that make it possible. Although it rewards risk-taking,
Montesquieu wrote, commerce also depends on constancy and
thrift.59 The merchant must be diligent, foresighted, and careful
to avoid needless expense; he must be orderly and reliable. As an
example, Montesquieu offered the port city of Marseille, whose
barren territory precluded other pursuits and “made its citizens
decide on economic commerce” as a way of life.60 Their vocation
required the Marseillais to be “hardworking in order to replace
See id. at 43. The doux commerce thesis has sparked a voluminous literature through the centuries, both pro and con. For good introductions to the thesis,
and the classical critiques of it, see ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, RIVAL VIEWS OF MARKET
SOCIETIES AND OTHER RECENT ESSAYS 105–41 (1986) [hereinafter HIRSCHMAN,
RIVAL VIEWS]. See also ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, THE PASSIONS AND THE INTERESTS
59–63, 70–81, 100–13 (1977) [hereinafter HIRSCHMAN, PASSIONS].
55 See, e.g., HIRSCHMAN, PASSIONS, supra note 54, at 60, 70–81 (discussing
Montesquieu); id. at 100–13 (discussing Smith); HIRSCHMAN, RIVAL VIEWS, supra
note 54, at 109 (discussing Hume); Oman, Doux Commerce, supra note 26, at 713
(discussing Voltaire).
56 See, e.g., HIRSCHMAN, RIVAL VIEWS, supra note 54, at 43 (discussing
meaning of “doux commerce”); HIRSCHMAN, PASSIONS, supra note 54, at 59 (noting the difficulty of translation).
57 See, e.g., McGinnis & Movsesian, supra note 41, at 521 (describing theory
of comparative advantage).
58 See HIRSCHMAN, RIVAL VIEWS, supra note 54, at 41–43 (explaining that
doux commerce theorists perceived political benefits of commerce).
59 MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS 340–41 (Anne M. Cohler et al.
trans. & eds., 1989) [hereinafter THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS].
60 Id. at 341.
54
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that which nature refused them,” and “frugal,” too, “in order to
live always by a commerce that they would the more surely preserve the less it was advantageous to them.”61
To the Enlightenment mind, commerce’s capacity to promote stability made it far superior to other pursuits, especially the
quest for glory and domination—associated most strongly with the
aristocracy—which inevitably led to political violence and ruin.62
Christianity had shown itself unequal to the task of curbing the
lust for glory, Enlightenment thinkers believed, but the market
would succeed.63 In economist Albert Hirschman’s words, “the
steady, if self-centered pull of commercial interests would serve
more efficiently as a brake on passionate behavior than the traditional appeals to reason, duty, morals, and religion.”64 Commerce,
Adam Smith maintained, would train people in habits of prudence, “the most useful” of all the virtues.65 Although not “a hero,”
the prudent man was “dependable and decent[;]” importantly, he
minded his own business.66 This image of the merchant as a
peaceable and reliable, if somewhat distant, neighbor is consistent
with Samuel Johnson’s famous observation that “[t]here are few
ways in which a man can be more innocently employed than in
getting money.”67
Second, commerce promoted the tolerant attitudes that made
liberalism and pluralism possible, most especially, the willingness
to ignore religious differences and cooperate peaceably as citizens.68
After decades of religious wars in Europe, Enlightenment thinkers were eager to divorce religion from civil life (in this, they have
been perhaps too successful, but that is a subject for another essay),
and they perceived that the market, which distributed rewards and
punishments irrespective of belief, could provide a mechanism for
doing so. The most famous example of this kind of thinking appears
Id.
HIRSCHMAN, RIVAL VIEWS, supra note 54, at 40.
63 See id. at 38.
64 Id. at 40.
65 DENNIS RASMUSSEN, THE PROBLEMS AND PROMISE OF COMMERCIAL SOCIETY: ADAM SMITH’S RESPONSE TO ROUSSEAU 119 (2008) (quoting Adam Smith,
THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS (1790)) (“prudence [is] ‘of all the virtues
that which is most useful to the individual’”).
66 Id. at 120.
67 JAMES BOSWELL, THE LIFE OF SAMUEL JOHNSON 242 (1791) (Bergen Evans
ed. 1952).
68 Paul Horwitz, The Hobby Lobby Moment, 128 HARV. L. REV. 154, 177 (2014).
61
62
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in Voltaire’s observations on the Royal Exchange of London, from
his Philosophical Letters (1733):
Take a view of the Royal Exchange in London, a place more venerable than many courts of justice, where the representatives
of all nations meet for the benefit of mankind. There the Jew,
the Mahometan, and the Christian transact business together,
as though they were all of the same religion, and give the name
of Infidels to none but bankrupts; there the Presbyterian confides in the Anabaptist, and the Churchman depends upon the
Quaker’s word. At the breaking up of this pacific and free assembly, some withdraw to the synagogue, and others to take a
glass. This man goes and is baptized in a great tub, in the name
of the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost; that man has his son’s foreskin cut off, and causes a set of Hebrew words—to the meaning
of which he himself is an utter stranger—to be mumbled over
the infant; others retire to their churches, and there wait the
inspiration of heaven with their hats on; and all are satisfied.69

The market would train people to think of religious commitments
as incidental concerns that one could not allow to impede cooperation on other, more important and productive activities.70 This
education in benign indifference would be very useful for liberal
politics as well.
Finally, commerce trained people in the habits of reciprocity and fairness, if for no other reason than to maintain a reputation for these things, which has definite cash value.71 A merchant
must make himself known to others as cooperative and reliable, as
someone who gives as well as receives value. To be perceived as an
opportunist who takes unfair advantage of his customers, or who
renders little in return for trade, is poisonous to long term commercial
success. Eighteenth-century writer Samuel Ricard described it:
Sensing the necessity to be wise and honest in order to succeed,
[the merchant] flees vice, or at least his demeanor exhibits decency
VOLTAIRE, THE WORKS OF VOLTAIRE, VOL. XIX (Philosophical Letters)
(1733), http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/voltaire-the-works-of-voltaire-vol-xix-philo
sophical-letters [http://perma.cc/MX69-BHPE].
70 See RASMUSSEN, supra note 65, at 17 (“Following Locke, [the philosophes]
argued that what is needed is less a citizenry that practices the ancient or Christian
virtues than industrious individuals who help increase their society’s standard
of living ....”).
71 See, e.g., id. at 121–22 (discussing Smith’s understanding of the importance
of reputation in a commercial society).
69
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and seriousness so as not to arouse any adverse judgment on the
part of present and future acquaintances; he would not dare make
a spectacle of himself for fear of damaging his credit standing ....72

Centuries later, the German sociologist Georg Simmel would suggest
that commerce could even promote a kind of social empathy, since
it encouraged businessmen to identify with their customers in order
to sell them things.73 The key point is that commerce encourages
people to be other-regarding in a way that abstract religious and
moral commitments cannot and, thus, promotes the social harmony
necessary for stable politics.74
According to the doux commerce thesis, the benefits of commerce were not limited to domestic politics. Internationally, too,
commerce was thought to promote harmony by creating networks
based in nations’ reciprocity and mutual interest.75 “The natural
effect of commerce is to lead to peace,” Montesquieu wrote.76 “Two
nations that trade with each other become reciprocally dependent;
if one has an interest in buying, the other has an interest in selling,
and all unions are founded on mutual needs.”77 In fact, the more
self-confident versions of the doux commerce thesis predicted a
peaceful global civilization grounded in trade. Commerce “is a pacific system, operating to cordialize mankind, by rendering nations,
as well as individuals, useful to each other,” Thomas Paine declared in The Rights of Man (1792).78 “If commerce were permitted to act to the universal extent it is capable, it would extirpate
the system of war .... The invention of commerce ... is the greatest
approach towards universal civilization, that has yet been made
by any means not immediately flowing from moral principles.”79
HIRSCHMAN, RIVAL VIEWS, supra note 54, at 108.
See GEORG SIMMEL, CONFLICT AND THE WEB OF GROUP AFFILIATIONS 61–62
(Conflict, Kurt Wolff trans. 1955). See also HIRSCHMAN, RIVAL VIEWS, supra note
54, at 121 (discussing Simmel).
74 For more on how commerce promotes “other-regardingness,” see OMAN,
supra note 1, at 44–46.
75 SPIRIT OF THE LAWS, supra note 59, at 338.
76 Id.
77 Id.
78 THOMAS PAINE, RIGHTS OF MAN, COMMON SENSE, AND OTHER POLITICAL
WRITINGS 265 (Mark Philp ed. 1995).
79 Id. at 266.
72
73
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The doux commerce thesis drew criticism at the time, and
has done so ever since, both from the Left and the Right.80 Even
its originators perceived weaknesses in the thesis. Montesquieu
conceded that commerce could corrupt good morals as well as promote them—he cited Plato as authority for this, which shows how
far back debates about the social effects of commerce go—and lead
to what we would today call “commodification,” the tendency to
reduce all human interactions and relationships to cash value.81
“We see that in countries where one is affected only by the spirit
of commerce”—he offered Holland as an example—“there is traffic
in all human activities and all moral virtues; the smallest things,
those required by humanity, are done or given for money.”82 The
human impulse to generosity atrophies in commercial societies,
he warned, as everything becomes a matter of exchange.83 By contrast, “hospitality, so rare among commercial countries, is notable
among bandit peoples.”84
Smith, too, recognized the moral dangers that lurk in commercial societies.85 In such societies, he believed, people constantly
devote themselves to “the pursuit of wealth” and, consequently,
“have little time to undertake any activities that require great
courage or spirit.”86 They increasingly lose interest in civic affairs
and the capacity to defend themselves and their homes from foreign violence; generally, they become bad citizens.87 Commerce leads
to inequality and promotes wasteful ostentation and useless luxury—
a later critic would call it “conspicuous consumption”—that in
turn promotes envy and social discord.88 Most of all, commercial
society encourages an insatiable acquisitiveness that ultimately
contributes to people’s unhappiness, as they accumulate more and
HIRSCHMAN, RIVAL VIEWS, supra note 54, at 110, 112.
“Commerce corrupts pure mores, and this was the subject of Plato’s complaints ....” SPIRIT OF THE LAWS, supra note 59, at 338. On “commodification,”
see OMAN, supra note 1, at 170.
82 SPIRIT OF THE LAWS, supra note 59, at 338–39.
83 See id.
84 Id. at 339.
85 See RASMUSSEN, supra note 65, at 75.
86 Id.
87 Id.
88 See id. at 72, 82. On conspicuous consumption, see THORSTEIN VEBLEN,
THE THEORY OF THE LEISURE CLASS 49 (1899) (Martha Banta ed. 2007).
80
81
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more material goods in a futile effort to be contented—or, at least,
better off than others.89 Notwithstanding these criticisms, Smith
endorsed the doux commerce thesis, because he believed that commercial societies, for all their faults, represented a great improvement over the possible alternatives.90 But it is striking to see how
much Smith shared with the great eighteenth-century critic of the
commercial society, Rousseau.91
Smith could have found an illustration to justify his concerns about commercial society close to home. Eighteenth-century
London—that city whose Royal Exchange so impressed Voltaire
with its peaceable religious tolerance92—itself offered an example
of how commerce could degrade social values, at least according
to Samuel Johnson.93 In the Gordon Riots of 1780, Protestant
mobs enraged by the grant of civil rights to Catholics terrorized
the city for five days, burning Catholic churches and schools and
the houses of prominent Catholics until the army put them down,
at the personal order of the King, with considerable loss of life.94
Hundreds of people were killed.95 The citizens of London famously
did nothing to stop the rioters, a failure Johnson attributed to the
malevolent effects of commerce.96 Where Voltaire had seen commerce
as a civilizing force, allowing different religious communities to live
side by side and engage in mutually beneficial projects,97 Johnson
drew a different conclusion. Commerce, he believed, had made Londoners self-absorbed and indifferent to the common good.98 The
rioters could easily have been put down if only other citizens had
See RASMUSSEN, supra note 65, at 82–88. Two centuries later, describing
the subsequent history of the market society in the West, sociologist Daniel Bell
put it this way: “In Aristotle’s terms, wants replaced needs—and wants, by their
nature, are unlimited and insatiable.” DANIEL BELL, THE CULTURAL CONTRADICTIONS OF CAPITALISM 224 (1976).
90 RASMUSSEN, supra note 65, at 12–13, 159.
91 See id. at 51.
92 See supra text accompanying note 69.
93 NICHOLAS HUDSON, A POLITICAL BIOGRAPHY OF SAMUEL JOHNSON 181,
192 (2013).
94 ROBERT TOOMBS, THE ENGLISH AND THEIR HISTORY 359–60 (2015).
95 PETER ACKROYD, LONDON: THE BIOGRAPHY 486 (2000).
96 HUDSON, supra note 93, at 181, 192.
97 See supra text accompanying note 69.
98 HUDSON, supra note 93, at 181, 192.
89
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stood up to them. But no one did. “Such,” he famously observed,
“is the cowardice of a commercial place.”99
III. THE BURKEAN CRITIQUE
The arguments for and against the political benefits of markets have been recapitulated many times down the centuries.100
It does not make sense to catalogue all the arguments here; the
debate, it seems to me, has been fought to a draw. Each side can
adduce evidence to support its position. Doux commerce enthusiasts can point to the success of trade in pulling countries out of
poverty and in bringing together previously warring nations in new
political unions, like the European Union.101 Skeptics can point to
the many societies throughout history that have followed the path
from industriousness and thrift through wealth to decadence, including the one with which Oman begins and ends The Dignity of
Commerce: Renaissance Venice.102 The high level of trade between
states has not prevented violent conflicts between them and, as
for the European Union, it is impossible to ignore the crisis it
faces today, notwithstanding the high volume of trade in goods
and services among the members states.103 I will return to the
example of the European Union in a moment.
We will not resolve the debate here. Perhaps, as Albert
Hirschman once suggested, the doux commerce thesis is right and
wrong at the same time: the market both promotes and corrupts
good morals.104 I would like to spend some time, though, on what I
think is the most powerful critique of the doux commerce thesis, a
critique we do not often hear nowadays. It is a conservative critique,
most closely associated with Edmund Burke, that Old Whig who has
ACKROYD, supra note 95, at 485 (internal quotations removed).
For a good summary of the arguments through history, see HIRSCHMAN,
RIVAL VIEWS, supra note 54, at 117–35.
101 See McGinnis & Movsesian, supra note 41, at 521–22 (noting the importance
of trade to nations’ development).
102 OMAN, supra note 1, at 1–8, 183–84. For an accessible recent history of
Venice, see generally THOMAS F. MADDEN, VENICE: A NEW HISTORY (2012). For
more on Venice, see infra text accompanying notes 122–43.
103 See Mark L. Movsesian, The Persistent Nation State and the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 1083, 1092 (1996) (noting that financial interdependence among nations did not prevent the outbreak of the First
World War).
104 See HIRSCHMAN, RIVAL VIEWS, supra note 54, at 139.
99

100
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come to stand for conservatism in the English-speaking world.105
Burke’s critique should make us skeptical about commerce’s capacity to promote pluralism and liberalism where those values do
not already exist.
Burke favored free markets, religious toleration, and political pluralism.106 But he did not see any of those things as inevitable,
and he did not think free markets alone could produce the other
two. For Burke, the doux commerce thesis had cause and effect
backwards.107 The market does not create virtues and habits of
mind; rather, it depends on pre-existing virtues and habits of mind,
like law-abidingness, probity, toleration, and trust, all of which
people bring to it from other sources—from the wider culture, and,
especially, from religion.108 Without those pre-existing virtues
and habits, the free market would collapse.
The most famous example of Burke’s thinking in this regard
comes from his Reflections on the French Revolution, which he wrote
in 1790.109 In Reflections, Burke offered an extended critique of the
French Revolution and the ideas that motivated it, including the
rationalism of the philosophes.110 One mistake the philosophes made,
105 See JESSE NORMAN, EDMUND BURKE: THE FIRST CONSERVATIVE 146
(2013) (Burke was “a New Whig in chronology, but an Old Whig in spirit”); id.
at 286 (noting that Burke offers a critique of markets “not from the left of the
political spectrum, but from the right”). For a classic introduction to Burke and
his politics, see generally RUSSELL KIRK, THE CONSERVATIVE MIND: FROM BURKE
TO ELIOT (7th rev. ed. 1985). For a more recent treatment, see generally YUVAL
LEVIN, THE GREAT DEBATE: EDMUND BURKE, THOMAS PAINE, AND THE BIRTH OF
RIGHT AND LEFT (2014).
106 See NORMAN, supra note 105, at 91 (Burke’s views on religious toleration);
id. at 118 (Burke’s admiration of India’s “religious and cultural pluralism”); id.
at 283 (Burke’s support of free markets).
107 See J.G.A. Pocock, The Political Economy of Burke’s Analysis of the French
Revolution, 25 HIST. J. 331, 337, 347 (1982).
108 See NORMAN, supra note 105, at 208–09 (explaining that, for Burke, successful commerce depended on social “manners,” which, in turn, depend in large
part on religion); id. at 283 (explaining that Burke “was an early supporter of
free markets, but only within a strong context of personal probity, law, market
norms and trust”). See also Pocock, supra note 107, at 347 (discussing Burke’s
views on manners and markets).
109 See generally EDMUND BURKE, Reflections on the Revolution in France
(1790), in REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION IN FRANCE AND OTHER WRITINGS
425 (Jessie Norman Ed., 2015) [hereinafter REFLECTIONS]. For an introduction
to the Reflections, see LEVIN, supra note 105, at 28–31.
110 KIRK, supra note 105, at 26.
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according to Burke, was to trust in abstract ideas, rather than history
and custom, as a basis for organizing and sustaining society.111
This mistake extended to economics, which the philosophes believed
an independent science that could operate, of itself, to create good
morals.112 But this was deeply wrong. The market, Burke argued,
depended on “ancient manners,” which, in turn, depended on religious and social traditions.113 The famous passage from Reflections
that expresses Burke’s understanding is worth quoting at length:
We are but too apt to consider things in the state in which we
find them, without sufficiently adverting to the causes by which
they have been produced, and possibly may be upheld. Nothing is
more certain, than that our manners, our civilization, and all the
good things which are connected with manners and with civilization have, in this European world of ours, depended for ages upon
two principles; and were indeed the result of both combined; I
mean the spirit of a gentleman, and the spirit of religion .... Even
commerce, and trade, and manufacture, the gods of our economical
politicians, are themselves perhaps but creatures; are themselves
but effects, which, as first causes, we choose to worship .... Where
trade and manufactures are wanting to a people, and the spirit of
nobility and religion remains, sentiment supplies, and not always
ill supplies, their place; but if commerce and the arts should be
lost in an experiment to try how well a state may stand without
these old fundamental principles, what sort of a thing must be a
nation of gross, stupid, ferocious, and, at the same time, poor and
sordid, barbarians, destitute of religion, honour, or manly pride,
possessing nothing at present, and hoping for nothing hereafter?114

Most conservatives today are likely to be put off by Burke’s
praise of aristocracy—the eighteenth-century revolutions have succeeded well in that regard—but his basic point remains accessible.
The tolerant, pluralist marketplace of the doux commerce thesis
NORMAN, supra note 105, at 194; cf. KIRK, supra note 105, at 9 (discussing
this aspect of conservative thought).
112 KIRK, supra note 105, at 65 (“Burke knew that economics and politics are
not independent sciences: they are no more than manifestations of a general
order, and that order is moral.”). See also Pocock, supra note 107, at 347 (“Burke
proposed to reverse the Scottish thesis that commerce had been the motor force
behind the growth of manners ....”).
113 REFLECTIONS, supra note 109, at 493. See also NORMAN, supra note 105,
at 209 (“Commerce and business have promoted the growth of manners; but
ultimately both commerce and politics rely on manners—that is, on the trust
engendered by the social order.”).
114 REFLECTIONS, supra note 109, at 493.
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is itself a “cultural artefac[t]” that cannot be divorced from the
Western traditions that gave rise to it.115 It is wrong to think that
markets inevitably lead to liberalism. It is the liberal tradition that
creates the sort of marketplace Enlightenment thinkers praised.
This critique makes a great deal of sense to me. Markets existed before the Enlightenment project began, and will exist after
the Enlightenment project runs its course, and not all of them have
been or will be characterized by religious indifference and pluralism. When I reread Voltaire’s famous description of the London Exchange, for example, I thought of a different anecdote from the other
side of Europe, from many centuries earlier. Like eighteenth-century
London, Byzantine Constantinople had a thriving economy, based
largely in commerce.116 In late antiquity and the medieval period,
Constantinople was perhaps the most economically dynamic city in
the world, with astounding wealth and markets that drew traders
from across the Mediterranean.117
Yet, Byzantium was hardly a liberal, pluralist society, and it
was not religiously indifferent.118 In fact, judging from contemporary
accounts, the residents of Constantinople had a sort of mania for religious disputes.119 As theologian Timothy (now Metropolitan Kallistos) Ware puts it, “[t]oday, in an untheological age, it is all but
impossible to realize how burning an interest was felt in religious
NORMAN, supra note 105, at 286.
See Angeliki E. Laiou, Byzantium and the West, in BYZANTIUM: A WORLD
CIVILIZATION 61, 72 (Angeliki E. Laiou & Henry Maguire eds. 1992); Elizabeth
Williams, Trade and Commercial Activity in the Byzantine and Early Islamic Middle East, METROPOLITAN MUSEUM OF ART (May 2012), http://www.metmuseum
.org/toah/hd/coin/hd_coin.htm [https://perma.cc/J645-8GAF]. On trade in the Byzantine economy, see generally Angeliki E. Laiou, The Byzantine Economy in
the Mediterranean Trade System; Thirteenth–Fifteenth Centuries, in GENDER,
SOCIETY AND ECONOMIC LIFE IN BYZANTIUM 177–222 (1992).
117 See Williams, supra note 116. See also MADDEN, supra note 102, at 60 (noting
that twelfth-century Constantinople was “the richest city in the Western world”).
118 See, e.g., DONALD M. NICOL, CHURCH AND SOCIETY IN THE LAST CENTURIES
OF BYZANTIUM 2 (1977) (explaining that in “the Byzantine world, the distinction between things spiritual and things temporal was often blurred and seldom defined”); MARK WHITTOW, THE MAKING OF BYZANTIUM, 600–1025, at 126
(1996) (explaining that most Byzantine subjects “saw themselves less as ‘Romans’
than as ‘orthodox Christians’”).
119 On the pervasive importance of theological debate in Byzantine society,
see NICOL, supra note 118, at 6–7.
115
116
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questions by every part of society, by laity as well as clergy, by the
poor and uneducated as well as the Court and the scholars.”120 Here,
for example, is a famous letter by Gregory of Nyssa, one of the fourth
century Cappadocian Fathers, describing how difficult it was to
engage in the simplest, quotidian transactions without having to
debate theology:
The whole city is full of it, the squares, the market places, the
cross-roads, the alleyways; old-clothes men, money changers,
food sellers: they are all busy arguing. If you ask someone to give
you change, he philosophizes about the Begotten and the Unbegotten; if you inquire about the price of a loaf, you are told by
way of reply that the Father is greater and the Son inferior; if you
ask ‘Is my bath ready?’ the attendant answers that the Son was
made out of nothing.121

The traders of Byzantium did not, it seems, check their religion at
the door.
Or consider the example with which Oman begins and ends
his book, Renaissance Venice, the Venice of Shakespeare’s play.122
At the time—and since—Venice offered the prototype of the commercial republic, a city where people from different, and mutually
antagonistic, religions made fortunes trading peacefully with one
another, regardless of confessional loyalty.123 Venice was a tolerant, bourgeois place, indifferent to most things besides trade and
profit.124 The city’s great wealth and culture depended on its willingness to host different communities, and enforce contracts among
them, without worrying about what Rawls would later call “comprehensive doctrines.”125 What an inspiration for liberalism and
the doux commerce thesis!
TIMOTHY WARE, THE ORTHODOX CHURCH 35 (new ed. 1997).
Id.
122 OMAN, supra note 1, at 1–8, 183–84.
123 For an evocative description of commerce during Venice’s heyday, see PETER
ACKROYD, VENICE: PURE CITY 101–19 (2009) [hereinafter ACKROYD, VENICE]. For
a description of the many religious and ethnic communities that resided in the
city, see id. at 42–45.
124 See id. at 101.
125 See OMAN, supra note 1, at 4–5. On Rawls and “comprehensive doctrines,”
see Leif Wenar, John Rawls, in THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY
(Edward N. Zalta ed. Spring 2017), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2017
/entries/rawls/ [http://perma.cc/X3JP-GA55].
120
121
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Yet, this is only part of the story. Venice was also an intensely traditional, hierarchical place.126 The city balanced devotion
to the fluid world of commerce with an equal devotion to the static
world of custom.127 As Peter Ackroyd explains in his marvelous
book, Venice: Pure City, Venice was “the most conservative of societies.”128 In law and government, ancient usage had preeminent
authority, more than positive legislation.129 Social interactions followed patterns that did not change for centuries.130 Convention
dictated what clothes different classes could wear.131 Patricians
wore stiff black gowns, which highlighted gravity and authority,
not flexibility and cosmopolitanism.132 In architecture, generation
after generation followed old models. When buildings collapsed,
Venetians would reconstruct them exactly as they had been, often
using the same materials.133 Dov’era, com’era.
And Venice was exceptionally religious. The city’s enthusiastic participation in the Crusades is well known, and was a matter
of great pride for Venetians.134 Crusading was always partly a search
for loot, of course, but for Venetians it was more than that. Venetians were genuinely devout, perhaps excessively so.135 Hundreds
of churches shared a very small space in the city; religious processions were numerous and frequent.136 Reports of miracles were
common; only Rome had more.137 Venetians were not saints. They
never lost sight of the main chance. But Christianity was central
This and the next paragraph are drawn from an earlier essay. Mark
Movsesian, The Merchants of Venice: Markets and Tradition in the Serene Republic,
FIRST THINGS (April 27, 2015), https://www.firstthings.com/blogs/firstthoughts
/2015/04/the-merchants-of-venice [https://perma.cc/4GGZ-P3KC].
127 ACKROYD, VENICE, supra note 123, at 93.
128 Id.
129 Id. (noting that “[c]ustom was ... considered to transcend positive or systematic law”).
130 See id.
131 See id. at 126–27.
132 Id. at 126.
133 Id. at 93. A very good example is the bell tower of St. Mark’s. After it
collapsed in July 1902, Venetians rebuilt it, on the same spot, exactly as it had
been. MADDEN, supra note 102, at 398–99.
134 MADDEN, supra note 102, at 115.
135 ACKROYD, VENICE, supra note 123, at 300 (noting that the Venetian people were “excessively devout”).
136 Id. at 301.
137 Id. at 291.
126
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to their identity.138 Ackroyd sums it up best: “Machiavelli wrote
that ‘we Italians are corrupt and irreligious beyond all others.’ That
was not true of the Venetians. They were corrupt and religious.”139
If we want to explain what made Venice so wealthy and
stable over centuries, then, we must take into account not only its
devotion to commerce, but the deeply traditional nature of Venetian
society.140 Commerce alone did not make Venice what it was; it was
also the strong bonds of religion and custom that drew Venetians
together and allowed them to cooperate efficiently. And commerce
did not render Venice, in the end, a model of liberal toleration. The
secret police were famous, and informers were everywhere.141
Venice was a closed society, one which allowed outsiders like Jews
to reside in the city in order to enrich it, but which did not treat
them as equal members of the community.142 It was Napoleon’s
army, not centuries of doux commerce, which finally put an end
to the Venetian ghetto.143
In this regard, I take a rather different message from
Shakespeare’s play than Oman does. For Oman, The Merchant of
Venice is important for what it says about the market’s role in
promoting “the wealth and the liberal character of the city.”144 The
play’s central dilemma, he says, is that Venice must enforce the
contract for a pound of flesh if the city’s prosperity and way of life
are to be preserved.145 If the city fails to honor all contracts, even
those that give cruel rewards to foreigners like Shylock at the expense of Venetians like Antonio, its commerce will dry up, “Since
that the trade and profit of the city / Consisteth of all nations.”146
Foreigners will no longer trade in the city. A plot device saves the
situation, but the message is clear: liberalism, tolerance, and the
See id. at 289–90.
Id. at 290.
140 Id. at 93 (noting the traditionalism of Venetian society).
141 Id. at 89–91.
142 See id. at 49.
143 See David Laskin, 500 Years of Jewish Life in Venice, N.Y. TIMES (March 9,
2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/13/travel/venice-italy-jewish-ghetto
.html [https://perma.cc/4TNB-F4U4].
144 OMAN, supra note 1, at 183.
145 Id. at 4–5.
146 Id. at 5 (quoting SHAKESPEARE, THE MERCHANT OF VENICE act 3, sc. 3, 30–31).
138
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profit that comes from them depend on the neutral enforcement of
all contracts, regardless of the identity of the parties.147
I read The Merchant of Venice differently. To me, its central
message is that commerce cannot, in the end, obscure deep religious
difference and promote lasting peace between rival communities.
In his great essay on the play, “On Christian and Jew,” Allan
Bloom uncovers the play’s essential truth: commerce promotes
only a superficial cooperation, a surface tolerance that disappears
at moments of crisis148:
The law of Venice can force [Shylock and Antonio] to a temporary
truce, but in any crucial instance the conflict will re-emerge, and
each will try to destroy the spirit of the law; for each has a different way of life which, if it were universalized within the city,
would destroy that of the other. They have no common ground.149

Only when people agree about what is most important in life can
they be said to form a community—and doux commerce can hide
disagreements for only so long.150
But we do need not look to Renaissance Venice, or medieval
Byzantium, or eighteenth-century London to perceive the limits
of the doux commerce thesis and the truth of the Burkean critique.
Current events offer good evidence. In the international context,
since the fall of the Iron Curtain in 1989, the West has made the
expansion of liberal markets a centerpiece of its diplomacy.151 The
so-called “Washington Consensus” promoted “democracy, free markets, and the rule of law”—the fundamentals of neoliberalism—as
the keys to global development.152 It inspired the transformation
of the GATT into the WTO and the creation of regional free trade
zones like NAFTA.153 The doux commerce thesis also supported
Id.
Allan Bloom, On Christian and Jew, in ALLAN BLOOM & HARRY V. JAFFA,
SHAKESPEARE’S POLITICS 13 (1964).
149 Id. at 17.
150 See id. at 20–21 (“When men do not agree about what is most important,
they can hardly be said to constitute a community.”).
151 See, e.g., Antony Anghie, The Grotius Lecture: ASIL 2010ɆInternational
Law in a Time of Change: Should International Law Lead or Follow?, 26 AM.
U. INT’L L. REV. 1315, 1344 (2011).
152 Ozan O. Varol, Stealth Authoritarianism, 100 IOWA L. REV. 1673, 1725 (2014).
153 See Robert Howse & Kalypso Nicolaïdis, Toward a Global Ethics of Trade
Governance: Subsidiarity Writ Large, 79 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 259, 264–65
147
148
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the drive for “an ever closer union” in Europe.154 A single market was
supposed to provide the foundation for a common political enterprise that could join together countries as diverse as the UK and
Bulgaria and sustain a common currency for economies as different
as Greece and Germany.155 And the doux commerce thesis inspired
the movement to install liberal markets in places, like Russia,
that lacked a liberal tradition.156 All these endeavors assumed that
market liberalism would inevitably have beneficial political consequences—that ethnic and national identities would recede in
favor of pluralism, tolerance, and other liberal political values.
Things can change, of course, but at the moment this project
does not look like a great success.157 Liberalism and democracy are
not experiencing triumph across the world; in fact, rather the opposite.158 The movement toward global free trade has stalled.159 The
Doha Round of trade negotiations broke down several years ago over
disagreements between developed and developing countries (and also
within the developed world) over agriculture subsidies, and shows
(2016) (discussing WTO); Patricia Fernández-Kelly, NAFTA and Beyond: Alternative Perspectives in the Study of Global Trade and Development, 610 ANNALS
AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 6, 6 (2007) (discussing NAFTA). On the transformation of GATT to the WTO, see Robert Howse, The World Trade Organization
20 Years On: Global Governance by Judiciary, 27 EUR. J. INT’L L. 9, 13–24 (2016).
154 Consolidated Version of The Treaty on European Union art. 1, Oct. 26, 2012,
2012 O.J. (C 326) 13 (“This Treaty marks a new stage in the process of creating an
ever closer union among the peoples of Europe ....”)
155 See The EU in Brief, EUROPA (July 20, 2017) https://europa.eu/euro
pean-union/about-eu/eu-in-brief_en [https://perma.cc/MDY5-368N]. For the current
list of EU Member States, see EU Member Countries in Brief, EUROPA (July 20,
2017) https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/countries/member-countries
_en [https://perma.cc/6BNN-JTPY].
156 Cf. NORMAN, supra note 105, at 238, 285 (discussing Western policy toward
Russia in the 1990s).
157 See Nikil Saval, Globalisation: the rise and fall of an idea that swept the
world, GUARDIAN (July 14, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jul
/14/globalisation-the-rise-and-fall-of-an-idea-that-swept-the-world [https://perma
.cc/699R-L5GW].
158 See Roberto Stefan Foa & Yascha Mounk, The Danger of Deconsolidation,
27 J. DEMOCRACY 5 (2016). See also Mark Movsesian, The End of the Liberal
Tradition?, FIRST THINGS (Aug. 17, 2016), https://www.firstthings.com/web-exclu
sives/2016/08/the-end-of-the-liberal-tradition [https://perma.cc/ZAX3-PBF6].
159 See, e.g., Timothy Meyer, Saving the Political Consensus in Favor of Free
Trade, 70 VAND. L. REV. 985, 987–88 (2017).
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no sign of revival.160 As one of his first acts, President Trump withdrew the US from the Trans-Pacific Partnership—Hillary Clinton
would likely have done the same—and his supporters’ irritation
with NAFTA helped elect him last November.161 Trump tapped
into a long-simmering resentment among Americans who perceive free trade, and the free immigration that accompanies it, as
a threat to their livelihoods and ways of life.162
In Europe, old national divisions have resurfaced; indeed,
they never really went away.163 If anything, national ties seem to
have strengthened as the EU has expanded to include countries
outside the Western European core, and as people come to realize
what the free movement of people actually entails.164 Following the
Brexit referendum in June 2016, the UK triggered the formal exit
process in March 2017.165 Significant anti-EU movements exist in
France, Italy, the Netherlands, even Germany—and of course in
poorer members like Greece, where 2015’s debt crisis threatens to
break out again.166 In Russia, the attempt to create political pluralism through deregulation and the export of liberal markets obviously
has failed.167 As Jesse Norman writes, Russia lacked the liberal
traditions that make free markets work—for example, levels of
Rafael Leal-Arcas, The European Union and New Leading Powers: Towards Partnership in Strategic Trade Policy Areas, 32 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 345,
362 (2009). For more on the collapse of the Doha Round, see generally Stephen
Kim Park, Talking the Talk and Walking the Walk: Reviving Global Trade and
Development after Doha, 53 VA. J. INT’L L. 365, 378–84 (2013).
161 See Meyer, supra note 159, at 988, 998.
162 On how opposition to free trade helped propel Trump to the White House,
see id. at 988, 998.
163 See Christina Pazzanese, In Europe, nationalism rising, HARV. GAZETTE
(Feb. 27, 2017), http://news.harvard.edu/gazette/story/2017/02/in-europe-nation
alisms-rising/ [https://perma.cc/7XQV-HCJ8].
164 See id.; Tony Barber, A renewed nationalism is stalking Europe, FIN.
TIMES (July 11, 2016), https://www.ft.com/content/53fc4518-4520-11e6-9b66-0
712b3873ae1.
165 Anushka Asthana et al., May triggers article 50 with warning of consequence for UK, GUARDIAN (Mar. 29, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/politics
/2017/mar/29/theresa-may-triggers-article-50-with-warning-of-consequences-for-uk
[https://perma.cc/C8Q2-MYCL].
166 See Guide to nationalist parties challenging Europe, BBC NEWS (May 23,
2016), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-36130006 [https://perma.cc/9ECH
-BWHP].
167 See NORMAN, supra note 105, at 238–39.
160
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social trust that encourage people to deal fairly with strangers.168
As a result, market liberalization in Russia merely “assisted the
loss of public assets to the new oligarchs.”169
In Burkean terms, the crisis facing the EU, and the resistance to regional trade agreements like NAFTA, demonstrate
that the doux commerce theory gets cause and effect backwards.
Projects like the EU and even NAFTA require that people trust
one another and feel they belong to the same community. But the
market cannot create community where it does not already exist,
or, to put it in opposite terms, cannot overcome divisions when those
divisions are sufficiently deep.170
Domestically, too, the doux commerce thesis has shown its
limitations lately. Everyone knows about the recent clashes between LGBT couples and business owners who decline, from religious conviction, to provide services for same-sex weddings.171
Neither side is willing to look the other way, as the doux commerce
thesis suggests they should—neither the LGBT couples, who could
easily find other businesses to provide the services, nor the business owners, who could easily make money, and avoid lawsuits, by
providing them.172 The Contraception Mandate offers another illustration.173 Firms felt strongly enough about the issue that they
were unwilling to bracket their deep convictions in order to have
smooth commercial dealings—and people on the other side were likewise unwilling to forgo theirs.174 On questions like these, as Paul
Horwitz writes, “the marketplace has become a battleground.”175
Or take another example. In New York City, where I live,
stores owned by Hasidic Jews got in trouble with the city’s human
Id. at 285.
Id.
170 See Bloom, supra note 148, at 17; id. at 20–21 (“When men do not agree about
what is most important, they can hardly be said to constitute a community.”).
171 E.g., Craig v. Masterpiece Cakeshop, 370 P.3d 272 (Colo. App. 2015), cert.
granted sub nom. Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights Com’n, ___
U.S. ___ (2017). See also State v. Arlene’s Flowers Inc., 389 P.3d 543 (Wash. 2017);
Elane Photography, LLC v. Willcock, 309 P.2d 53 (N.M. 2013), cert. denied, 134
S. Ct. 1787 (2014).
172 For an argument that the doux commerce thesis would help participants
avoid “intractable dispute[s]” about providing services for same-sex weddings,
see Oman, Doux Commerce, supra note 26, at 696. See also id. at 719–32.
173 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
174 See Horwitz, supra note 68, at 180–84.
175 Id. at 183.
168
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rights commission a few years ago for requiring shoppers to “dress
modestly.”176 “Dress modestly” apparently meant no low necklines
on women, and some women complained that the stores were violating their human rights.177 The city eventually dropped the case,
after the stores agreed to post additional signs stating they did
“not discriminate on the basis of race, religion or gender,” but the
basic point remains.178 Neither side in the dispute was willing to
look the other way—not the storeowners, who stood to lose business, nor the shoppers, who could have exercised old-fashioned
market discipline by taking their custom elsewhere. Examples
like these show the truth of Bloom’s observation.179 Where there
are deep clashes of values—and, in twenty-first-century America, no
clashes are deeper than those involving identity—commerce can
do little to overcome them.
Perhaps these controversies are outliers. But more systematic evidence exists of the limits of doux commerce in American
life. Twenty-first-century America is a market society. As Michael
Sandel observes, “[w]e live at a time when almost everything can
be bought and sold.”180 If anywhere, you would expect the doux
commerce thesis to bear fruit here, in our own commercial republic. Yet, notwithstanding the dominance of the market metaphor
in our culture, levels of social trust in America are quite low.181 For
decades, the General Social Survey has asked respondents whether
they thought that most people could be trusted.182 In 1972, almost
half of Americans said yes. In the latest survey, in 2016, only about
Mark Movsesian, NYC Sues Hasidic Shopkeepers Over Dress Codes, FIRST
THINGS (Feb. 21, 2013), https://www.firstthings.com/blogs/firstthoughts/2013/02
/nyc-sues-hasidic-shopkeepers-over-dress-codes [https://perma.cc/7UB7-69NF]
(internal quotations omitted).
177 Id.
178 Joseph Berger, No Fines for Stores Displaying a Dress Code, N.Y. TIMES
(Jan. 21, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/22/nyregion/no-fines-for-stores
-displaying-a-dress-code.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/6VDC-32B7].
179 See Bloom, supra note 148, at 17. See also id. at 20–21.
180 MICHAEL J. SANDEL, WHAT MONEY CAN’T BUY: THE MORAL LIMITS OF
MARKETS 5 (2012).
181 Josh Morgan, The Decline of Trust in the United States, MEDIUM (May 20,
2014), https://medium.com/@monarchjogs/the-decline-of-trust-in-the-united-states
-fb8ab719b82a [https://perma.cc/6ZT6-W669].
182 GSS Data Explorer, Can people be trusted, NORC UNIV. CHICAGO (2017)
https://gssdataexplorer.norc.org/variables/441/vshow [https://perma.cc/8VXW
-HWCM].
176
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a third of us still said the same.183 By contrast, about two-thirds
of Americans agreed with the statement, “You can’t be too careful
in dealing with” others.184 Younger Americans are less likely than
older Americans to say they trust people.185
I have no way to know whether levels of social trust in
America would be even lower without doux commerce. And I do
not maintain that commerce itself has led to a decline in social trust
in America, any more than that commerce itself has led to a rise
in nationalism across the world. Classical liberalism generally is
at a moment of crisis, both in the United States and abroad, and
political pluralism seems at a breaking point.186 The decline in social
trust in America is surely bound up with that crisis, and no doubt
reflects many factors including, as political scientists Roberto Foa
and Yascha Mounk maintain, a loss of faith in democracy itself.187
But the point of the doux commerce thesis is that commerce generates trust and reciprocity and makes people comfortable cooperating with strangers on mutually beneficial projects.188 The evidence
from the GSS suggests that is not happening in contemporary
America189—or, if it is, it is happening to a disappointing degree.
CONCLUSION
Ever since Carlyle, conservatives have dismissed liberal
economics as the “dismal science.”190 But that nickname is unfair.
In fact, classical liberalism is profoundly optimistic, and the doux
commerce thesis reflects that optimism. Allow people to trade
with one another, it holds, and the results will be wealth, tolerance,
pluralism, and a benign indifference to deep disputes that would
The figures are available at the General Social Survey website. Id.
See id.
185 George Gao, Americans divided on how much they trust their neighbors,
PEW RES. CTR. FACT TANK (Apr. 13, 2016), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank
/2016/04/13/americans-divided-on-how-much-they-trust-their-neighbors/ [https://
perma.cc/JEY7-QMHV].
186 See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
187 See Foa & Mounk, supra note 158, at 16.
188 See Oman, Doux Commerce, supra note 26, at 710.
189 Can people be trusted, supra note 182.
190 William Lucy, Method and Fit: Two Problems for Contemporary Philosophies of Tort Law, 52 MCGILL L.J. 605, 607, 607 n.1 (2007) (discussing origin
of phrase).
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otherwise divide us. The market is, to adapt James Russell Lowell’s
famous quote about the American Constitution, “a machine that
would go of itself.”191 The law’s role is to support the market and
allow it to create its considerable political benefits. What could be
more optimistic than that?
The Dignity of Commerce makes a great contribution to contracts scholarship, and I agree with many of the points it makes.
To the extent the book’s argument for the moral benefits of commerce
relies on the doux commerce thesis, however, I think it too optimistic. This is the crux of my disagreement with Oman: I am more
pessimistic than he about the market’s political benefits. In fact,
I will close with Oman’s own observation about likely responses to
his book. It is an observation with which I wholeheartedly agree:
To the extent that one is an optimist about the moral possibilities
of markets, then one should be enthusiastic about the extension
of contract law to govern larger swathes of human interaction. To
the extent that one is more subdued in one’s assessment of markets’ moral value, then one’s view of contract law’s domain should
be similarly limited.192

191 Laurence Tribe, Bicentennial Blues: To Praise the Constitution or to Bury
It?, 37 AM. U.L. REV. 1, 5 (quoting Lowell) (internal quotations omitted).
192 OMAN, supra note 1, at 18.

